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This is intended to be a critical introduction to the concept of mimesis as it is laboured by 
the Brazilian author Luiz Costa Lima. Costa Lima’s mimesis has its earliest roots both in 
the skepticism with which he regards current literary criticism, as well as in his 
absorption of Wolfgang Iser’s reader-response theory. As an historical-analytical tool, it 
relies on its own distinction from its Latin translation as imitatio as a means to recover the 
profound implications of the ancient Greek term for the theory or representation – 
implications that remained obscured after mimesis was viewed with suspicion by the 
concept of ‘free art’ and by avant-garde poetics. In an effort to bring literature back to its 
historical soil and to reassess its social relevance, through the concept of mimesis Costa 
Lima intends to forward some new paradigms for literature and for literary critique, 
thereby touching upon a broad range of theoretical and philosophical topics. While 
retracing Costa Lima’s quest, this presentation wants to reveal the many important and 
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COSTA LIMA’S MIMESIS: A SCRIPT FOR NEWCOMERS 
 
How can one appropriately do justice to Luiz Costa Lima’s concept of mimesis in a paper-length text? It is not 
an easy task, since mimesis covered many hundreds of pages and over two decades of his intellectual 
production. Nonetheless, here I will outline an overall mapping of his perspectives on the theme; given that 
Costa Lima’s books are not easily (or fully) available to the English reader, this might be of use.  
 
His earliest writings on mimesis date back to 1979. Over the last three decades he constantly returned to the 
theme, always approaching the concept’s fate in modern aesthetic thought as a means to recover its fertility for 
contemporary debate. In Costa Lima’s work that ancient concept is invited to shed a new light on current 
critical, historical and analytical practice; mimesis is used to reveal aspects of modern and contemporary literary 
thought that had remained unseen, and to suggest ways to overcome deadlocks and shortcomings.  
 
In the next sections I’ll try to disentangle the many issues that underlie his positions, so that Costa Lima’s 
personal and intellectual motivations might become clear. Through mimesis he simultaneously triggers a large 
number of topics. His mimesis affects (as well as derives from) an interconnected range of subjects, giving each 




Costa Lima narrates his encounter with aesthetics of reception as a turning point in his career. This is quite 
significant, because for years he had been in close dialogue with structuralism (especially with the anthropology 
of Lévi-Strauss), starting from his 1973 doctorial dissertation until (at least) his 1976 study on Cornélio Penna. 
Yet already in 1979 he is found translating Jauss and Iser into Portuguese, which reveals that for him, too, a new 
paradigmatic definition of literature was at stake: literature was not composed of ‘texts’ anymore; it was now a 
complex of meanings produced by readers through ‘the act of reading.’  
 
This open reference to Iser’s great book anticipates that he will soon become a greater influence on Costa Lima 
than Jauss would ever be. As Jauss places reading as its object of study and methodological paradigm, defining 
it as a series of historically-specific relations between readers and the synchronically-consolidated ‘horizons of 
expectation,’i aesthetics of reception (in practice) functions as a (sophisticated) variation of sociology and 
history of literature. Following a somewhat different direction, Iser’s reader-response theory understands 
reading as an individual event, which is to be described and studied (in all its implications) not in an historical or 
sociological manner, but through a phenomenological approach (which never necessarily disregards history or 
sociology, it should be said).ii Iser’s main question is: how does an empirical reader read a literature book? 
Which is the same as asking: what determines the specificity of literary reading (as opposed to any other kind of 
reading)? It probably seemed to Costa Lima that Iser’s propositions were better suited to investigate how 
literature empirically exists for readers – which is different from studying a text in its immanence. It is no mere 
detail that in Iser’s work reading is an act: he wants to examine the factors and preconditions that join together 
to produce its ‘typical’ or ‘usual’ results, the factors and preconditions that characterize the special kind of 
production ventured by the reader of literary texts. 
 
Therefore in 1979, when (to many of his contemporaries) it seemed that Costa Lima was incorporating the 
novelty of the Constance School as a whole, he was actually ‘digesting’ it.iii He preserved Jauss as a somewhat 
distant reference while making Iser his ‘brother in arms.’ Cutting between immanent textual analysis and a 
cultural-sociological understanding of literature, reading (and its effects on the reader) had become, for Iser and 
Costa Lima, quintessential to the very definition of literature – so that if a theory of literature wants to make 
serious claims to being a science of literature, the act of reading must co-define its object of study.  
 
This is the point from where Costa Lima’s theory of mimesis departs.   
 
TO DEFINE LITERATURE  
 
At this point it is necessary to skip over fifteen years of his academic production, in order to arrive at Costa 
Lima’s understanding of literature. Examining this moment allows us to gain a full appreciation of his concept 
of mimesis.  
 
In Limits of Voice: Montaigne, Schlegel, Kafka, he says that literature acquired its function in modern times as 
society felt the need to deal with a ‘Law’ that refused to make itself visible, or refused to be conceptualized.iv 
What Costa Lima calls ‘Law’ is the unwritten set of codes, norms and expectations that orientates and defines 
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human thought and action. Our supposedly unlimited capacity to think is actually circumscribed by socially- and 
historically-specific concepts, expectations and prohibitions that determine what is thinkable. In modernity, 
‘Law’ appears – to soon become an instrument of the status quo – with the rise of (legitimated and self-assured) 
subjective reason: progressively, any realm that could not be taken over by either divine or scientific legislation 
would be governed by a set of ethical, moral and aesthetic codes that were positively imposed and experienced, 
but hardly self-declared (and even less theorized). The ‘Law’ is a modern socio-historical mental frame, 
moulded by the current horizons of power, ethics and knowledge, but without fully coinciding with them. The 
‘Law’ is unstable (or flexible) and almost invisible, for it encompasses thought by giving it its own (‘natural’) 
shape. The ‘Law’ is power, because it is the silent framework that determines thought and speech. It is certainly 
a vague framework, but nevertheless effective: it has power of determination exactly because it is vague. Yet 
being so illusive, how could the ‘Law’ become known and rendered visible? Costa Lima’s answer is sharp: 
through literature, which between the sixteenth and the seventeenth century becomes consolidated as an 
autonomous modality of discourse.  
 
Between the self and the experienced reality, there is a gap that the ‘Law’ can only partially fill (for there is 
always a ‘lack of completeness’ in experienced sense, as it is impossible for the ‘Law’ to bridge all the lacunae 
that the available structures of meaning – including the ‘Law’ itself – leaves open). In Limits of Voice literature 
is defined as the type of discourse to provide readers with some access or view to the ‘Law.’ Contrary to what 
philosophy might try to do, literature will not theorize (or even try to represent) the ‘Law.’ Literature is not 
about the ‘Law,’ it is a perspective on reality that tries to expose it, if not in its essence (for such an essence 
barely exists), at least in its operation or practical use. Literature preserves enough similarity with conventional 
beliefs and daily experience to make itself familiar to the reader; at the same time, it does not fully obey the 
‘Laws’ that those beliefs and experiences (in their empirical manifestations) rely on. Literature is different and 
similar to the ‘Law’ and this is how it makes the ‘Law’ visible, allowing us to see what remains hidden in daily 
social practice, i.e. the ‘Law’ as a constitutive social power. In Limits of Voice literature is defined as a discourse 
that distances itself from reality in order to access reality in a new (and specific) way, thus making literature 




From Limits of Voice and its definition of literature we return to our main topic. It remains to be understood how 
his encounter with the Constance School helped shape Costa Lima’s mimesis, specially knowing that in the 
1960s and 70s that concept had become mistrusted by literary critique.  
 
In 1979 that mistrust made it necessary for Costa Lima to justify his choice.v He does it partially in a negative 
way, in an effort to undermine the reasons that had lead to the concept’s abandonment. In the years to follow he 
strove to make this point clear: that the ‘banishing’ (as he classifies it) of mimesis had been caused by a too-
formalistic understanding of the notion of ‘free art,’ from the beginning in the conceptualization that the term 
‘art’ underwent since the late eighteenth century. Costa Lima was suspicious of the idea (derived from Kant’s 
third Critique) that modern art had become free from its previous institutional ties and also from representing 
any ‘content’ available in the ‘external world.’ His suspicion lay not with the idea of artistic ‘freedom’ itself, but 
with some of its unintended consequences.  
 
Two problems characterize this suspicion. First, Costa Lima felt that this so-called ‘liberation’ carried with it 
some normative notions: should art simply ‘enjoy’ that freedom, or should it compromise itself with non-
representation?vi Second: from the standpoint of perception, was it actually true that ‘reality’ – be it physical or 
imaginary – could ever be absent from aesthetic experience?vii Even when we stand before an ‘abstract’ 
painting, is it true that no reference to ‘external reality’ will take part in the experience it provokes in us?   
 
This second point straightens his ties with Iser’s reader-response theory. The issue is mainly epistemological: 
How can we keep our minds from associating what we see (on the canvas) to images we relate to the pre-
existing world and to concepts we use in order to understand it? I emphasize the ‘we’ pronoun because a reader-
response theory is also concerned with the images and concepts which readers attach to the objects that provoke 
them aesthetically. (This is notwithstanding the fact that their personal participation in the phenomenon of 
aesthetic reception is certainly motivated by the work; it is a circular relationship between work and receptor, 
not a linear one). This perspective clearly distances itself from strict formal analysis. A formal approach to 
representation would inquire whether the work itself makes clear references to pre-existing reality; reader-
response theory makes this point partially senseless. Whereas one would define representation as a defining 
asset of a text or image, the other defines it as a phenomenological precondition of aesthetic experience. In this 
respect, there is no way a work of art could avoid the attribution of reality to it by the receptor, especially 
14 
 
because since ‘language,’ ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ cannot simply be erased even momentarily from our minds. 
Rather, they are always present.  
 
As to the first point mentioned above – remember that Costa Lima also mistrusted the concept of ‘free art’ for 
being insidiously normative – it led him into a different path of inquiry. The concept of ‘free art’ had always 
been considered politically positive, for it released the art system from the control or surveillance by other social 
systems. However, critique’s insistence upon non-representation, especially after structuralism and 
deconstruction, was only possible through the notion that artworks were self-referent (i.e. referential to 
themselves as forms, as well as to the art system itself and its history).viii According to this description art is 
‘absolute poiesis’: just as it does not follow any model or norm, any reference it makes to the ‘world’ should not 
be deemed as copy or representation; not being ‘self-transparent media,’ art builds up meaning aesthetically. Art 
would thus be uncompromised with meaning as it is experienced in daily social exchange, but only as it is 
artistically produced, i.e. as an immanently aesthetic fact. Taken to the extreme, this would force a sharp divorce 
between aesthetically- and empirically-experienced meanings.  
 
However, at what cost was this notion established? What was the cost of associating aesthetic difference to 
formal difference, and formal difference to the self-referentiality of aesthetic language? At a time when artistic 
language was becoming inextricable to the majority of the public, did not this conception help alienate art from 
regular social intercourse? Did it not help make art the territory of a ‘privileged few’? Hence the poignant 
question: Was critique not partially responsible for this alienation?ix  
 
The two issues of non-representation, first as a disregard to the phenomenology of literature and second as a 
normative definition of literature, will be dropped for the moment, to later reappear below. At this point we 
realize that the question that opened this passage has not really been answered: Why mimesis?  
 
Actually, the answer has been at least initiated. We will see that Costa Lima’s reasons for bringing in the Greek 
term and the precise shape he gave it came from the necessity of giving a response to those contemporary 
deadlocks in the theory of artistic representation.  
 
A RENEWED CONCEPT OF MIMESIS 
 
Costa Lima’s mimesis could not be more distant from its Latin translation as imitatio.x In his work the 
‘similitude’ associated with the term is displaced: as it is substantiated into ‘text’ and ‘reading,’ similitude is 
understood, and appreciated, as difference.  
 
Mimesis is not imitatio because it is built through a series of selections from external reality that produce an 
impression of reality only as long as they differ from reality. It is no surprise that on Costa Lima’s work mimesis 
will eventually lead to a theory of fiction,xi since fiction’s specificity lies in its capacity to depart from 
recognizable reality in order to build up a different construct, which arouses in the reader a certain 
‘representation’ of reality that is not offered by reality itself. Fictions feed on reality, selecting therein the 
elements through which they make themselves understood and experienced, but that do not simply repeat or 
reinforce ‘what is already there.’ They re-present reality, i.e. they present reality in ways that differ from its 
usual (or ‘daily’) perception.xii  
 
This is why Costa Lima’s mimesis does not rely on bare ‘representation,’ but on what he calls ‘representation-
effect.’ The accent now lies not upon the extent to which works of literature ‘absorb’ the pre-existing world, but 
upon the extent to which they differentiate the world as they absorb it, thereby allowing the reader to 
differentiate his/her usual perspectives on it. ‘Effect’ then refers to the (unpredictable) perspectives literature 
opens up for readers as it creates and exposes a (literary) world that re-creates the (everyday) world. Mimesis is 
production (and not reproduction) because its sameness produces difference (understood not as substance, but as 
effect).xiii Because it is not imitatio, it does not contradict the foundations of modern art; as creation, it not only 
confirms the expectations regarding art as an autonomous (and subjective) production but also grants it a unique 
social function – as a production that is counterproductive, as an encounter that brings displacement, as a 
similarity that reveals otherness.  
 
At times the otherness brought on by mimesis will stimulate the reader’s critical faculties. As Costa Lima puts it, 
mimesis has the (potential) power to estrange the reader from the tranquility of routine, as it is able to detach 
common sense (which we are never aware we ourselves incorporate) from its inertia towards what’s already 
known, already felt, already thought. Mimesis can produce unrest as it exposes man’s (and man-made 




It may be that this understanding of mimesis sounds too modern to justify the recurrence to the Greek term. 
Despite this, as he rereads Aristotle, Costa Lima suggests that even though a thinking of difference ‘in itself’ 
couldn’t have been possible in the Greek ambience, the awareness Aristotle had of the distance between fact and 
‘fiction’ allows us to think that already in the Poetics there was (an embryo of) the idea of the non-substantiality 
– of the merely apparent substantiality – of fictionally-represented reality.xv Be that as it may, even if we are 
forced to agree that Costa Lima’s mimesis finds its only true legitimacy in the post-Romantic ambience (which 
is most likely to be true), the choice for the Greek term still preserves its polemic edge. Rather than flowing with 
the tide, Costa Lima took a step back (in his conceptual apparatus) in order to put his own time under scrutiny. 
 
But why ‘under scrutiny’?  
 
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE CURRENT STATE OF LITERARY CRITIQUE 
 
Returning to literary critique, for Costa Lima the predominance of sociological and immanent textual readings 
in the twentieth century enforced a dichotomy that left little choice between understanding literature as a ‘text’ 
or as a social (or historical) ‘document,’ a pair of options that obliterated any fecund understanding of 
literature’s specificity.xvi Costa Lima’s theory of mimesis cannot be detached from an extensive questioning of 
the role assumed by critique in defining literature and in shaping the literary field – a role we must now fully 
develop. 
 
Once again his work becomes historical. He identifies the many varieties of sociological readings and of 
immanent textual analysis as the two most widespread branches of twentieth century analytical practice. As we 
said, the danger of the former was to transform literature into social document. As to the latter, it ran the risk of 
estranging literary analysis from a truly critical practice. Let us examine these two possibilities. 
 
To understand literature as document was not new in the twentieth century. It began in the aftermath of 
Romanticism, when scholarship and state-run teaching transformed literature into a national patrimony (with 
great consequences in Latin America, where newly created countries wanted to erase their colonial pasts in 
search of their own national identities).xvii It was a time when writers occupied a central role in Western public 
debate, since it was generally accepted that literature had some kind of social function to perform – and that 
therefore the writer’s voice was one to be heard. 
 
In the twentieth century, as theories of literature began to be written, sociological analysis renewed this (by now 
doubtlessly weakened) function through its commitment to the apprehension of the ‘social content’ of literary 
works, whose values would be thereby judged. But as it focused on the presence and political value of the 
‘social content’ of literary works, sociological analysis regarded literature as ‘reflex’: as a (more or less active) 
‘response’ to social matters. As a way to avoid this trap, in the late 1970s Costa Lima declared mimesis as a 
means to describe how literature is rooted in society and history without being strictly determined or explained 
by them.xviii  
 
Running parallel to his critique of sociological analysis, Costa Lima’s debate against formalistic readings took 
him via an extended route. We already know his claim (following the Constance school) that formal analysis 
doesn’t respect the phenomenology of reading: literature is not written for philologists to read, and the effects it 
produces on readers do not coincide with and do not derive from textual minutiae, which are rarely perceived as 
such by the common reader. It is as if formalism tended to regard literature as a ‘body’ to be dissected by 
experts – but there was something else to it.  
 
Conceiving literature as a ‘document’ invested critique with the power of establishing (‘once and for all’) the 
meaning of a text, by ‘finding out’ what its ‘precise’ socio-historical content was. Interpretation thus stabilized 
meaning in quite arbitrary ways, a practice that has been so extensively deconstructed over the past decades that 
we do not need to linger any further on it. Nevertheless, what about trying to ‘deconstruct’ the ways through 
which formal analysis also (forcefully) stabilizes our appreciation and understanding of literature? For instance, 
back in 1979 very little had been said against formalism’s raw distinction between literature and empirical 
reality: since texts cannot ‘reproduce’ reality, they were said to be self-referential entities. Furthermore, since 
literary texts were built upon the (more or less) conscious knowledge of their own estrangement from reality, for 
critique it was their textual construction and deconstruction of reality that became an object of study – under the 
notion that ‘reality’ could be textually represented only as paradox (the paradox of representing although being 
aware of the impossibility of representation). This in turn gave rise to a conception of literature as the self-




These notions rely on the assumption that texts are either capable of representing reality faithfully or that they 
are not, there being no room for a third alternative. On the contrary, Costa Lima will claim that yes, there is a 
third alternative.xix He grounds his claim on the distinction between what he calls ‘semantic instability’ and 
‘interpretive undecidability.’ One thing does not necessarily lead to the other: even if we agree that semantic 
instability is a central characteristic of Modern literature this does not make interpretation impossible. To be 
instable is not the same of being entirely missing; the rarefied substantiation of ‘external reference’ in Modern 
literature doesn’t implicate that ‘external reference’ is not there to be grasped.xx Of course, semantics is 
extremely complexified in Modern literary texts. However, Costa Lima sustains, with mimesis, that literature 
has strong and inevitable links with society and history. If we believe – and here the issue becomes power-
related – that reality is not at stake in literature (if it is only ‘text’ that matters), the critic is allowed to ignore the 
text’s concrete relations with society and social life (in the historically-specific loci where literature happens to 
generate impact).xxi As a consequence, the critic can also direct himself exclusively to the social environments 
and media (academia, specialized publications, etc.) he directly belongs to. Critique can then attribute to 
literature the features and expectations carried only by a reduced number of people; not a properly ‘social’ fact 
anymore, literature becomes the ‘property’ of a few. As we said before, in Costa Lima’s view this kind of 
critique helps reduce literature’s social impact by ignoring its concrete social ties and privileging (analytically) 
the very aesthetic codes that keep it from achieving a greater social presence. xxii 
 
Costa Lima understands that both sociological and textual analysis substitute real critique for some arbitrary 
(although at times sophisticated) definitions of literature. In his view critique should consider the primary 
relevance of aesthetic experience. Furthermore, because the critic himself was initially nothing more than a 
reader, he should notice that this is not a minor point.xxiii If the critic is at first a (mere) reader, in order to 
theorize critique one has to investigate how aesthetic experience stimulates the production of a form of 
communication (the critical text) that does not equal or replace the ‘original’ communication between the work 
of literature and the reader (the critic, in this case), but that necessarily derives from that original moment. In 
other words, one has to cope with the fact that if ‘the act of reading’ underlies both common and specialized 
reading, these two varieties of reading cannot be radically different from each other.  
 
So also critique departs from reading, and reading is what allows for the experience of mimesis. As experience, 
mimesis produces a link between literature, society and the reader – but as such it is inevitably as individual 
phenomenon. However, can critique be understood as personal testimony? Can it give up its claims to 
objectivity? Costa Lima states that critique originates from aesthetic experience, although it could never 
coincide with it since experience is not translatable into language. Even if it were, only personal and non-
transferable experiences could be thereby communicated, without necessarily offering any knowledge about the 
work in case. How could (supposedly objective) knowledge arise from personal experience? 
 
THE CRITIC AS A COMMON READER 
 
Keeping those matters open for a while, it is time to tackle in more detail the convergence Costa Lima identifies 
between common and specialized literary reading. 
 
For Costa Lima the critic is at first a reader like any other, by which he does not mean to deny relative 
differences in knowledge and familiarity with the object. What he wants to point out, again from a 
phenomenological perspective, is that a literary critic experiences reading just as anyone else would: the critic 
experiences effects that will impact on his ‘fractured subjectivity.’ This is a term Costa Lima creates to describe 
that fact that, even though we are not integral Cartesian subjects (even if our subjectivities are ‘manifold’) we 
still somehow experience subjectivity under an appearance of unity.xxiv  
 
By saying that a critic is a reader ‘like any other’ Costa Lima wants to draw attention to the fact that he will 
write his critique after experiencing an effect that cannot coincide with the properly ‘academic’ kind of 
knowledge he will put forward about the work. Specialized training surely interferes, but not ontologically: his 
reading can be different in its results, but not as a process.xxv 
 
This partition between analytical and ‘common’ knowledge surrounds Costa Lima’s theory of mimesis. His 
point is that receptors are not exactly distinguished by their bigger or smaller ‘aesthetic sensibilities’ or critical 
capacities. Distinction lies somewhere else, in the gap between experiencing and thinking about literature, 
activities that nevertheless originate in the experience of mimesis. For if critique is born from experience and if 
aesthetic experience implies some kind of rapport to experienced reality, it is impossible to erase ‘reality’ from 
the critical endeavour. Mimesis lies therein, as the sameness-difference that makes us share the fictionally-
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produced world through the ‘real’ or ‘previously-experienced’ world, and vice-versa, for (as Costa Lima likes to 
insist) mimesis is not a one-way street.xxvi But as Costa Lima bridges the gap between critical and common 
reading, what is the task left for critique? What remains as its specificity?  
 
CRITIQUE AS PARADOX 
 
Here Costa Lima will search for inspiration in early German Romanticism. Romantic critique was built around a 
paradox. It posited the task of discovering the ‘immanent law’ of literary works despite knowing that such 
‘immanence’ can only be ‘found’ by a ‘subject’ (the critic): whatever belongs to the work can only be grasped 
by outside observation. This paradox was not meant to be a paralysing one, though, and Costa Lima will face its 
challenge. 
 
In Limits of Voice he presents two different late eighteenth century perspectives on aesthetic experience. 
According to one of them aesthetic experience is essentially ‘mute,’ i.e. it cannot be communicated. Aísthesis is 
deemed as pure intensity and therefore alien to speech (for language would immediately establish another kind 
of regime, one that can be used to talk about experience, but never to ‘reproduce’ or ‘transmit’ it to someone 
else). It follows that experience cannot be legitimately criticized or judged: pertaining to one single subject, it 
can not be offered to public debate. But even though he agrees with the ‘untranslatability’ of experience, Costa 
Lima cannot accept this conclusion, for it takes art away from public interchange and secludes the individual. 
Costa Lima identifies this as part of the (unintended) historical heritage of Kant’s third Critique, especially in its 
late twentieth century reception.   
 
Friedrich Schlegel would attempt something quite different. Costa Lima portrays him as the true founder of 
literary critique, as he was the first author ever to have faced the challenge that is still ours: given that we cannot 
erase ourselves from the observations we make, and given literary works’ radical specificity (or uniqueness), 
how is it possible for us to speak objectively about them? If the critic cannot operate under laws that are 
universally applicable to the kind of phenomena he studies (as any scientist would), he must nonetheless search 
for the ‘law’ he understands to be imminent to a given artwork; not a universal law, but one that is proper to a 
single phenomenon. According to Costa Lima, that was how literary critique was born in Schlegel’s work: as a 
subjective search for an objective judgment, and as a theoretical formulation that cannot be universalized – a 
doubly paradoxical enterprise, as we see.   
 
Costa Lima believes in the subjective uniqueness of aesthetic experience, but not that it leads to critical 
muteness. He does not agree with the idea of a positive ‘law of the text’ whose existence would be independent 
from the reader who appoints it, but to him that does not mean that no objectivity pertains to literary texts: this 
notion is to be abandoned, for it legitimizes impressionistic reading. Between the texts and the projections of the 
critic-reader, something should be stabilized, yet the question remains as to how this can be done. As we see, 
Costa Lima faces Schlegel’s paradox. 
 
Again mimesis appears on the scene. In the critical practice idealized by Costa Lima, the stabilization of the 
interpreted matter produces in fact a meta-stability: it is the contingent positing by the critic of what he believes 
to mark the belonging of the literary work to the world it was produced in.xxvii  
 
Just as mimesis is difference produced through sameness (having reality as its horizon of dialogue), critique 
aims at understanding how this pair of linked positivities was built up in a specific work: how did that work re-
create the world it belonged to as a way to render it visible as difference, and not as sameness? On the 
production side, recurrence to external reference is quintessential to the production of difference. On the 
reception side, as an effect impinged on the reader, it is the unavoidable means through which literature 
communicates with society and its historical time.xxviii In the realm of critique, external reference provides the 
critic with the possibility of attaching a work of art to firm ground, by investigating its (always complex) 
belonging to social history, which is not the same as understanding one as a reflex of the other. Costa Lima’s 
critique is not base ‘reflex theory’ because in his view interpretation aims at positing the ratio or logic of the 
mímema, i.e. the textual structuring of its differentiation of sameness. Moreover, it cannot be accused of naïve 
epistemological realism, because as interpretation is shaped by aesthetic experience (through the act of reading), 
the critic must know that his own claims to objectivity are not enough to make his interpretation literally 
objective: Costa Lima’s critique admits the paradox of being simultaneously objective and subjective; it admits 
its own finite condition as an historically momentary proposition.xxix In other words, Costa Lima posits a clear – 





CRITIQUE AS DEBATE 
 
To assume the meta-stability of interpretation is by no means a sign of resignation. Costa Lima is not taking a 
step back and suggesting that the subjective rooting of interpretation makes it essentially individual (with the 
consequence that ‘anything goes’). Quite to the contrary, meta-stability only discloses that interpretations, being 
historically-determined, are never ‘definite’ or ‘right.’ Being rationally organized pieces of intellectual work, 
interpretations seek for validation by confronting themselves with the texts they talk about, as well as by 
exposing their own theoretical underpinnings as clearly as possible (as clearly as the critic himself can be aware 
of them).xxxi It is only by clarifying his own assumptions that the critic can claim that his interpretation does not 
derive exclusively from his own experience with the work. Furthermore, it is only by way of the clarification of 
his own presuppositions and methods that a critic can settle out a theory designed to explain it. Unlike scientific 
theories (which are universally applicable) these are ‘theories’ designed for one single object: they’re theoretical 
constructs made for the study of objects that are, unlike natural objects, always unique.xxxii It is by seeking for 
strong theoretical consistency that critique, although being subjectively made and historically-specific, can 
nonetheless lay claims to truth. This is the maximum of objectivity they can achieve. 
 
The meta-stability of critique brings a consequence: being contingent, critique gives rise to debate, and not to 
‘discovery,’ ‘explanation’ or ‘learning.’ There is nothing more senseless than ‘learning’ from critique ‘how to 
understand what a book is about’: critique is not truth in the same way that a scientific law is truth, but only in 
the way that a political statement is truth: it is truth only as much as it can lay claims to truth, and this is all. So 
the function of critique is not to ‘end up’ debate by giving it a final word, but to open and reopen it 
endlessly.xxxiii Critique produces thought from literary reading, thereby finding its proper status in the 
intellectual world: just like any other kind of (non-applicable or non-pragmatic) thought, critique aims at doing 
just what thought wants to do: to produce more thought. 
 
A piece of critique can only become ‘effective,’ can only provoke some impact as it establishes a link between 
itself and the experience its reader firstly had with the work in focus. This is how critique can insert the work in 
a broader debate. At this point mimesis establishes another junction between common and specialized reading. It 
is because of mimesis that ‘reality’ can orient the debate impelled by critique, and it is through mimesis that 
literature makes readers think. Mimesis returns the reader to the ‘world’; critique makes the reader return to the 
literary work, and also to the ‘world.’xxxiv If critique departs from mimesis, it can only be understood by having 
mimesis as a reference.   
 
However, critique must do this ‘scientifically,’ i.e. by facing the paradox of producing objective knowledge 
subjectively. Such objectivity, or claims to knowledge, impedes critique from merely translating the critic’s 
personal relation with the work. This relation must be confronted and tested so that critique is not hierarchically 
posited.xxxv As it is not ‘better’ than common reading it should not ‘tell the reader what to think,’ and it is by 
exposing its own underpinnings that critique can expose itself to debate without trying to impose its own 
acceptation. Costa Lima thus proposes critique as some kind of intervention, even when this intervention looks 
as promising as throwing a message in a bottle. 
 
THE VALUES BENEATH THE THEORY 
 
As a rapport between literature and reality, for Costa Lima the phenomenon of mimesis is located both in the 
texts and ‘in’ the readers. It is an immanent feature of a literary work as well as a product of the act of reading. 
This is why critique originates from the experience of mimesis (this is simply unavoidable) and why critique 
should have mimesis’ dialogue with reality as its main target: this is where literature and critique can find their 
(however minimal) social impacts. Mimesis is also what makes literature and critique finite and always open to 
change: their belonging to society and history can never be stable.  
 
At this point we meet the values that have given shape to Costa Lima’s mimesis right from the start. Mimesis is 
central to literature because it connects it to society at large – to individual experience and to random social 
exchange. Mimesis is what allows literature to make sense beyond literature itself, providing readers with a 
different belonging to reality. At the same time this applies to critique: as thought produces more thought that 
opens debate from itself, critique renews the links between literature and society (links that have become 
endangered as literature lost much of its former popularity).  
 
What Costa Lima (literally) wants to reinforce is the claim that ‘somehow, art educates’ (words translated from 
the introduction of his Mimesis: desafio ao pensamento). This is an actualization of an old Schillerian topos, one 
that never disappeared from aesthetic debate: the idea that art promotes Bildung. But if we follow the impact of 
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Friedrich Schiller’s – and very soon Romanticism’s – ideas about what the relation between art and society 
should be, we realize that they helped legitimate the divorce between one and the other – between art as an 
autonomous social system (represented by the art of genius) and society ‘at large’ (supposedly determined by 
the political and economic systems in its deep structuring, and by petty philistine or mass-moulded taste in its 
aesthetic structuring). This was not even straightforward divorce: it was clear-cut hierarchy, with the ‘good 
community’ of taste taking the lead. Costa Lima’s personal values as a critic of culture must be found 
somewhere along this line: for if he does not contradict the higher excellence of ‘Great Art’ (as opposed to 
‘popular art’ or to the so-called ‘cultural industry’) his epistemology of aesthetic experience and literary critique 
somehow ‘popularizes’ the field. It does so not by trying to make ‘great art’ popular (something not even 
Quixote would try to do these days) but by complexifying the presuppositions that established its (and 
critique’s) longstanding ‘ivory-tower’ positions.xxxvi This reveals Costa Lima’s uneasiness with our current state 
of affairs – it reveals how much he feels our ‘ivory-tower’ condition as a problem, not as a given. 
 
It is a stalemate situation: in order for literature to have the social relevance scholars often attribute to it, it 
cannot remain as a ‘property’ of a small number of readers; but if it acquires a larger audience, how could it 
preserve the formative function Costa Lima believes it has? The deadlock has no solution on sight, but Costa 
Lima places his bet. He believes we must rethink the means of communication between literature and 
experienced reality, therefore rethinking the role it can play in society through common and critical reading. He 
proposes to do it by reattaching literature to its social-historical soil without damaging its autonomy, thereby 
renewing the bet that late Enlightenment and early Romanticism had idealized. However, Costa Lima does this 
through a concept that had been banished as that very autonomy was declared and legitimized: he brings 
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